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ABSTRACT
The concept of the investment opportunity set (IOS), which was first noted by
Myers (1977), plays an important role in the capital market because it implies future
growth, which is relevant in predicting the shareholder’s expected wealth.
Unfortunately, IOS cannot be observed directly. Because IOS is an unobservable
construct, the researcher must find appropriate proxies for IOS to capture Myers’
idea. A number of studies have been done to obtain appropriate proxies of IOS. One
major finding is presented by Kallapur and Trombley (1999), that suggests
appropriate proxies of IOS and attempting to identify whether the IOS of the firms
are credible for representing the future (realized) growth.
This paper attempts to review IOS literature, especially Kallapur and Trombley’s
study. Some limitations of their study are noted here. This paper proposes a method
to confirm the constructs of IOS and develops a new model in searching appropriate
proxies for IOS. The present model also allows researchers not only to determine
appropriate proxies for IOS but also to identify which proxies of IOS have good or
bad information content.
Keywords : investment opportunity set, realized growth, information content.
ABSTRAK
Konsep investment opportunity set (IOS), yang pertama diungkapkan oleh Myers
(1977), memiliki peranan penting dalam pasar modal karena berimplikasi adanya
pertumbuhan di masa depan, yang relevan untuk meramalkan ekspektasi kekayaan
pemegang saham. Namun, kelemahannya adalah IOS tidak dapat diamati langsung.
Oleh karena itu, para peneliti harus mencari data yang tetap yang dapat mewakili
variabel IOS agar sesuai dengan gagasan Myers. Beberapa penelitian telah
dilakukan untuk itu termasuk penemuan dari Kallapur dan Trombley (1999) yang
mengusulkan beberapa variabel yang tepat untuk mewakili IOS dan juga mencoba
menentukan apakah IOS dari perusahaan-perusahaan cocok untuk menggambarkan
pertumbuhan masa depan yang actual.
Penelitian ini bertujuan mengkaji literature IOS, terutama penelitian Kallapur
dan Trombley. Beberapa kendala dari analisa mereka ditemukan. Penelitian ini
juga mengajukan metode baru untuk menentukan pengembangan IOS dan juga
mengembangkan model baru untuk mencari variabel yang tepat yang dapat
mewakili IOS. Model tersebut memampukan para peneliti untuk menentukan
variabel yang tepat untuk mewakili IOS dan juga membedakan variabel-variabel
tersebut berdasarkan informasi yang diberikan.
Kata kunci: investment opportunity set, pertumbuhan actual, isi informasi.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fisherian Theorem argues that managers make investment decision first and make
financing decision second, but the decisions are made in separate manner and
independent of each other (Copeland and Weston, 1988:12). However, when one
considers the asymmetry of information, the separation can no longer hold. Outside
investors do not have inside information about investment decisions that involve the
prospects of the firm. In other words, managers have more information about the
prospects of the firm than outside investors.
Asymmetry of information leads to a gap between managers’ perspective and outside
investors’ perspective. In an imperfect market, managers have more information about
future growth of the firm than outside investors (Taggart, 1980). Outsiders cannot
observe directly the managerial behavior in making investment decisions. Hence, they
attempt to investigate the managerial behavior in another way to assess the investment
decision.
Because investment decisions cannot directly observed, Myers (1977) introduced the
term investment opportunity set (IOS) to refer to the extent to which firm value depends
on future discretionary expenditures by the firm. Several proxies have been used in the
accounting and finance literature to capture Myers’ idea of the IOS, such as Smith and
Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver (1993); and Kallapur and Trombley (1999).
Kallapur and Trombley identified two related types of investment decisions based on
time horizon. First, realized growth, represent by investment made in the previous or
current periods. Second, investment opportunity, represented by a number alternative
investment chosen by managers in order to get an economic advantage in the future. They
argued that realized (current) growth is an implication of previous IOS. They identified
three proxies of IOS: price-based proxies, investment-based proxies, and variance
measures.
 Kallapur and Trombley’s idea to find the best proxies of IOS has implications for
further research, first for investor attempts to predict the future performance (investment
opportunity set) based on current performance (realized growth). The first implication
shows that although IOS is more relevant in explaining expected value of the firm, IOS
depends on realized growth. The time lag between IOS and realized growth might reduce
the power of IOS to predict future performance.
Second, if Kallapur and Trombley’s idea is true, researchers might focus on IOS rather
than realized growth. Some cost in the past and present investment might represent sunk
cost. Investors have a choice of changing or shifting their investment decision to buy or
sell the stock. Thus, the IOS is also related to financing decisions. The second implication
also has an impact on methodology. Further research might focus on how to measure the
best proxies of IOS that represent the unobserved investment decision.
However, Kallapur and Trombley’s study has some limitations in both methodology
and conceptual framework. Their study ignores the appropriate statistical tools and other
factors that might distort the relationship between IOS and realized growth. Because the
concept of IOS is relevant to explain the expected value of the firm rather than realized
growth, other methods and approaches in searching for the best proxies of IOS are still
needed to improve Kallapur and Trombley’s idea.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, this paper proposes another method to test
the reliability of IOS proxies. Second, this paper attempts to develop a new approach in
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finding appropriate proxies for IOS. The different approaches and proxies in assessing
IOS might lead to different results. Finding appropriate proxies of IOS has become
important in recent accounting and finance research. Investors need appropriate proxies
of IOS because IOS determines future growth of the firm.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The assumption of the Fisher separation theorem that there are perfect markets cannot
be met frequently in the real world. At least, this assumption cannot be implemented
universally. Moreover, in general, managers have more inside information than outside
investors, leading to a wide asymmetry of information. Outside investors cannot observe
directly managerial behavior in making investment decisions.
 Because the investment decision cannot be directly observed, Myers (1977)
introduced the term investment opportunity set (IOS) to refer to the extent to which firm
value depends on future discretionary expenditures by the firm. Several proxies have been
used in the accounting and finance literature to capture Myers’ idea of the IOS, including
Smith and Watts (1992); and Gaver and Gaver (1993). Kallapur and Trombley (1999)
classified these proxies into three types: (1) price-based proxies; (2) investment-based
proxies; and (3) variance measures. They found that price-based proxies are better than
other proxies of IOS to be related to realized growth as a benchmark.
 Kallapur and Trombley argued that future growth is an implication of IOS, and they
evaluate various proxies of IOS on the basis of the association between IOS and realized
growth. Based on their argument, this paper attempts to describe their conceptual
framework in Figure 1. This figure shows the association between realized growth and
IOS proxies.
Figure 1.  Relationship between IOS and Growth
Kallapur and Trombley’s model has a number limitation. First, in their perspective,
future growth is merely an implication of current IOS. In other words, current growth is
an implication of previous IOS. The model merely focuses on association between IOS
and actual investment or realized growth. During the transformation process from IOS to
actual investment, there are controllable and uncontrollable events that might disturb the
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association between the two. This model ignores other factors, which lead to a wider gap
between the previous investment opportunity compared to actual investment, such as
merger and acquisition, earnings management, agency problems, and the succession or
change of executives. External factors also might lead to a wider gap, such as the change
in level of competition in forward and/or backward markets, a turbulent environment, or
monetary disturbances (Romer, 1996:187), and irregular innovation, caused by research
and development (R&D). Although, the proxies of IOS cover R&D, it is usually difficult
to identify specific innovation (Romer, 1996:186).
Second, the model does not explicitly consider learning effects and the business cycle.
Mature firms might not plan more investment in the future. In contrast, declining firms
might divest their assets. These factors disturb the prediction power of the model. Third,
Kallapur and Trombley’s study employs inappropriate tools to investigate the proxies of
IOS. The IOS is an unobservable construct; hence, the indicators or proxies of IOS should
not be treated as individual items, but rather as a group of indicators to form the
composite index of IOS (Gaver and Gaver, 1993).
CONFIRMATORY MODEL OF INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET
In this section, this paper proposes a confirmatory model of the factor structures of
IOS. The present model is not same as the two previous studies, neither Gaver and Gaver
(1993) nor Kallapur and Trombley’s study in 1999. This paper argues that factor
structures of IOS are known or hypothesized a priori. The above discussion noted that
Kallapur and Trombley (1999) cite factor structures of IOS which can be classified into
three types: priced-based proxies, investment-based proxies, and variance measures based
proxies.1 Confirmatory factor analysis is a more appropriate tool to confirm or verify the
factor structure(s) (Sharma, 1996:128) rather than Spearman Rank correlation used by
Kallapur and Trombley (1999).
Figure 2 shows the confirmatory model of IOS. The model provides a rough guide to
verify or confirm the factor model. The model consists of a three-factor model with
correlated constructs that suggests examining interdependency between the three
constructs. The method is quite different from Kallapur and Trombley who ignore the
structure of each construct and the possibility of existing interdependency between the
three constructs.
                                                
1 This paper deals with a high level of abstraction. Hence, the operational identification of each indicator of
each (type) structure is beyond the scope of this study.
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Figure 2. Confirmatory Model of Investment Opportunity Set
DEVELOPING A MODEL OF INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET: A
SIMULTANEOUS MODEL
In the previous section, the discussion is more concerned with how to design the
constructs of IOS. Whether the constructs of IOS are appropriate with a particular
benchmark, is not discussed explicitly. Kallapur and Trombley argue that in order to
choose the appropriate proxies for IOS, it can be associated with realized growths as
benchmarks. Based on Kallapur and Trombley’s idea, this section attempts to develop a
new model as a rough guide in choosing appropriate proxies for IOS. The model
developed in this section allows researchers not only to classify the proxies of IOS based
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on each construct, but also to find appropriate proxies for IOS.
Referring to Kallapur and Trombley’s model, better proxies of IOS can be met when
there is higher correlation between the proxies and realized growths as benchmarks. The
model is only concerned with each proxy of IOS and realized growth individually.
However, the above discussion suggests that finding appropriate proxies of IOS is an
importance task because asymmetry of information means that managerial behavior in
cannot be directly observed by outside investors in making investment decision. Hence,
the IOS is an unobservable construct. Furthermore, some proxies of IOS might show
interdependence within each construct of IOS. The association between each proxy of
IOS and realized growth also allows interdependence not only within the construct but
also between the constructs. These properties indicate that a simultaneous model can
explain the relationship in equation (1) better than other model. Thus, the initial equations
of the two can be expressed as follows:
RGt = f2(At, St, It, Bt) (1)
IOSt-k = f1(P t-k, It-k, Vt-k) (2)
From Kallapur and Trombley’s study, equations (1) and (2) can be expressed
simultaneously as:
RGt = f1(P t-k, It-k, Vt-k) (3)
where:
IOSt-k = Investment opportunity set at t-k period
RGt = Realized growth at t period
Pt-k = Price-based proxies of IOS
It-k = Investment-based proxies of IOS
Vt-k = Variance measure-based proxies of IOS
At = Asset growth
St = Sales growth
It = Investment growth
Bt = Book value growth
IOS’s that are expressed in equation (1) are unobservable. Hence, Gaver and Gaver
(1993) use exploratory factor analysis to identify composite index based on six proxies of
IOS.2 Exploratory factor analysis tools are more appropriate to assess unobservable
construct(s) than Spearman rank correlation tool used by Kallapur and Trombley.
However, Gaver and Gaver’s model just provides composite indexes of IOS. Whether the
indices are appropriate for representing the proxies of IOS is not explicitly discussed in
their study. The present study provides another model to combine the two concepts using
a simultaneous equation model (SEM) of IOS. Equation (3) presented in this study
simplifies and resolves the problem of the two concepts.
                                                
2 If large number of IOS proxies considered, exploratory factor analysis usually produce more than one
construct of IOS. Thus, the equation (1) also can be expressed as more than one construct of IOS.
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VARIABLE CONTROL, INTERACTION EFFECT, AND IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION CONTENTS
The explanation power in equation (3) cannot be hold in the long-run, because there
are many events that might exist during time lags from investment opportunity set (IOSt-k)
through realized growth (RGt). The growth (actual investment) attained or realized by the
firms is dependent not only on the previous unobservable investment choices that they
make but also on events which are beyond their control. These uncontrollable and
controllable factors distort the association between IOSt-k and RGt. Thus, during the
transformation process, controllable and uncontrollable factors might increase the gap
between the two. Based on this argument, equation (3) should be expanded as follow:
RGt = f1(P t-k, It-k, Vt-k, CFt-r, UFt-r);     k > r (4)
Controllable factors (CFt-r) are defined as a number of internal changes during the
transformation process from IOSt-k through RGt, including the merger and acquisition,
earnings management, agency problems, internal ability, and the succession or change of
executives. Uncontrollable factors (UFt-r) are defined as a number of external changes
during the transformation process from IOSt-k through RGt, such as a change level of
competition in forward and/or backward markets, the environmental turbulence, monetary
disturbances, industry concentration, business life cycle, and shifting critical resource
dependencies.
Figure 3 shows how uncontrollable and controllable factors disturb the association
between IOSt-k and RGt. The conceptual framework proposed in this present study shows
that realized growth is a manifestation of the accumulation of investment and divestment
policies.
Figure 3. Distortion of The Association between IOS and Realized Growth
Notes:
IOSt-k = previous investment opportunity set 
RG = current realized (actual) growth                      = observable variables
CF = controllable factors
UF = uncontrollable factors                   = unobservable construct
Investment
RGt
Divestment
IOSt-k UFCF
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This paper argues that there are interactions between controllable and uncontrollable
factors. First, during the transformation process, internal changes might be made to
respond to external change. In an imperfect market, especially in an oligopoly market, the
internal changesor the action of individual firms might affect the aggregate market, and
lead to reaction of other firms. The action and reaction of the firms in industry increases
the competitive uncertainty. The uncertain conditions lead to revised investment or
divestment during transformation process. The revised decision caused by interaction of
the two factors will increase the gap between IOSt-k and RGt.
Second, in making investment decisions, managers will evaluate the feasibility of any
projects that are based on internal ability and external possibilities. The evaluations are
not only done in order to accept or reject the proposal of project, but also during the
transformation process. Internal abilities are important factors in the success of selected
investment projects.3 However, external possibilities4 might disturb the power of internal
ability to conduct the IOSt-k to RGt. Thus, equation (3) can be modified as follows:
RGt = f1(P t-k, It-k, Vt-k, CFt-r, UFt--r, CFt-rUFt-r);     k > r (5)
Equation (4) is clearly different with equation (5). The former treats CF and UF as control
variables, while the last treats CF and UF as both controlling variables and interaction
between control variables.
Figure 2 also explicitly shows that realized growth could be manifested by investment
and divestment decisions. By substituting RGt with actual net investment (Ian) and actual
net divestment (Dan) in equations (3), (4), and (5), one can identify clearly which proxies
of IOS are more relevant to explain actual investment decisions and which proxies of IOS
are more relevant to explain the divestment decisions. This model allows researchers not
only to determine the appropriate proxies of IOS but also to identify which proxies of IOS
have good or bad information content.
This concept is quite different with signaling theory. Signaling theory assumes that
high-quality firm managers have an incentive to somehow convince investors that their
firm should be assigned a higher valuation based on what the managers know to be a
superior prospect for the company (Megginson, 1997:19). Managers might prefer to use
the money to fund a particular investment rather than expense costly information signals
to outside shareholders. In other words, managers might prefer to maximize the current
shareholders’ wealth rather than expected wealth of outside or potential shareholders
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). If this argument holds, managers have no incentive to act as
signaling theory suggests. Thus, one cannot discriminate the high-quality and low-quality
firms. Hence, this study attempts to provide information content identification by
ignoring the signaling theory’s assumption.
Two necessary conditions should be met to identify whether the proxies of IOS
convey bad or good information content. First, if the proxies of IOS positively influence
the actual investment decision, it indicates good information content, and bad information
content brings the opposite result. Second, if the proxies of IOS negatively influence the
actual divestment decision, it indicates increasing value of proxies’ good information
content, while bad information content gives the opposite results.
                                                
3
The success of previous investment projects can be used as proxies for internal abilities. In operational
terms, previous or current realized growth can be used as proxies the internal abilities.
4
External possibilities are defined as super-system. It is wider than competitiveness of the industry, including
macroeconomic, labor market, and non-economic factors.
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However, the two necessary conditions are not enough to identify clearly whether the
proxies of IOS are credible to interpret as good or bad information content. Thus, this
present study also proposes two sufficient conditions. First, the proxies of IOS that
influence the investment decision should have opposite effects on divestment decisions.
Second, if magnitude of the two opposite effects is relatively equal, there is no good and
bad information content, because the effects of the two are offset one another.
CONCLUSIONS
Future growth is relevant to predict expected return, because future growth is an
implication of the investment opportunity set. While the investment opportunity set
cannot directly observed, finding appropriate proxies of investment opportunity set play
an important role in accounting and finance studies. This paper proposes a method to
confirm or verify the construct of investment opportunity sets. This paper also develops a
new model for finding the appropriate proxies of investment opportunity sets. The model
is concerned with whether the IOS of the firms are credible in representing future realized
growth. The model shows that maintaining the firm’s credibility is not simple as Kallapur
and Trombley described. During the transformation process, they address several
complex problems in relating the IOSt-k (investment opportunity set) to RGt (realized
growth).
Some implications for further research are noted in this study. First, the model
provided in this study is an abstraction. Further study requires translation of the
operational definition of each indicator to develop propositions. Second, the conceptual
model needs empirical studies to examine the validity of the model. Third, the model is
more concerned with the association between investment opportunity and actual
investment (realized growth), whether the actual of future growth is valuable is beyond
the scope of the model. This study suggests to the theoretically inclined might do better to
not only work on association between the investment opportunity set and realized growth,
but also examine whether the association is valuable and relevant to explain the expected
shareholders’ wealth in imperfect markets.
Fourth, if one of four conditions proposed in this study does not hold, it suggests other
complex implications for further research. This indicates that managers have less ability
to realize the actual investment or divestment decisions. Another implication is the
possibility of agency conflict. Contrary findings in examining the four conditions (both
necessary and sufficient conditions proposed in the present study) indicate the trade-off
between investment and divestment decisions. Because managers can choose future
discretional expenditure, this phenomenon leads to higher conflict of interest between
agent and principal. Thus, the fourth implication is also useful to identify the agency
problem suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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